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Abstract
Selecting a strong cryptographic algorithm makes no
sense if the information leaks out of the device through side-
channels. Sensitive information, such as secret keys, can
be obtained by observing the power consumption, the elec-
tromagnetic radiation, etc. This class of attacks are called
side-channel attacks. Another type of attacks, namely fault
attacks, reveal secret information by inserting faults into the
device. Because both side-channel attacks and fault attacks
are based on weaknesses in the implementation, they both
belong to the category of implementation attacks. This work
gives an overview of the state-of-the-art in implementation
attacks, reviews the origin of this problem at the CMOS cir-
cuit level and discusses countermeasures.
1 Introduction
The security of cryptographic circuits mainly depends on
their resistance against all kinds of attacks. While mathema-
tical attacks search for trapdoors in the cryptographic algo-
rithm, implementation attacks focus on weaknesses in the
implementation of the algorithm. In this contribution we
give an overview of the state-of-the-art in implementation
attacks and hardware countermeasures. Implementation at-
tacks can be divided into two categories: side-channel at-
tacks and fault attacks. Side-channel attacks try to extract
secret information based on some side-channel. This is a
physical quantity such as time, power consumption, electro-
magnetic radiation or sound. A fault attack is conducted by
injecting a fault in a cryptographic implementation, which
causes some stored values to change. These incorrect val-
ues compromise the security of the system. Section 2 and
3 focus on side-channel and fault attacks, respectively, to-
gether with some countermeasures. Conclusions are given
in Sect. 4.
2 Side-channel attacks
This section elaborates on the three most commonly ex-
ploited side-channel attacks, namely timing, power analysis
and electromagnetic radiation attacks. For power analysis
attacks, countermeasures at the circuit level are addressed.
Other side-channels such as sound and infrared radiation
will not be addressed in this contribution.
2.1 Timing attacks
In 1996 Kocher et al. introduced the concept of ti-
ming attacks by showing that secret information can be ex-
tracted throughmeasurements of the execution time of cryp-
tographic algorithms [6]. Timing attacks are applicable to
all implementations that have a non-constant execution time
which depends on the bits of the secret key.
2.2 Power analysis attacks
Two years later Kocher et al. performed successful at-
tacks by measuring the power consumption while the cryp-
tographic circuit is executing the implemented algorithm
[7].
Standard CMOS is the most commonly used circuit style
to implement digital circuits. Its popularity is the result of
its low power consumption and its robust behavior. Yet this
is also the source of information leakage. To explain why
the power consumption of a circuit can reveal information
on the data that are processed inside, we look at the power
consumption of a single CMOS inverter. Figure 1 shows the
four possible switching events at the output of an inverter.
It is clear that an inverter consumes no power when the
output value does not change (of course this is only true to
the first order, because in reality there is also leakage power
and short-circuit power). On the other hand, a change of
value causes supply current to flow and power to be con-
sumed. This fact does not only hold for an inverter, but also
for all other logic gates and for registers. Power analysis
attacks are based on this observation. More precisely, if the
value of a secret key bit determines wether a transition oc-
curs or not, measuring the power consumption reveals the
value of this bit.
The most straightforward power analysis, called Simple
Power Analysis (SPA), uses a single measurement to reveal
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Figure 1. Currents caused by the four different transitions
applied of a CMOS inverter.
the secret key by searching for patterns in the power trace.
However, implementations that are resistant against SPA at-
tacks, can still be broken by using a more advanced tech-
nique, namely Differential Power Analysis (DPA). In this
case many power measurements are evaluated using statis-
tical analysis.
2.3 Countermeasures for side-channel attacks
Security is as strong as the weakest link, therefore pro-
tecting cryptographic systems should be done on all levels
of abstraction, which are depicted in the security pyramid
in Figure 2. Each abstraction layer represents specific mod-
elling, design and implementation issues that must be cov-
ered for secure system operation [12]. In this contribution
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Figure 2. Security pyramid showing the different levels
of abstraction.
we focus on the circuit level to address countermeasures for
side-channel attacks as well as fault attacks.
As explained in Section 2.2, the power consumption of
a circuit depends on the output transitions of the gates. If
these transitions depend on secret information, the secu-
rity of the implementation can be compromised. Hence,
to make a circuit resistant against power analysis attacks,
the power consumption should be independent of the secret
information. The circuit-level approaches to achieve this
can be divided into two categories: custom logic styles and
standard logic styles. Custom logic styles are only applica-
ble to custom ASIC implementations. Standard logic styles
combine standard cells from existing libraries into new stan-
dard cells. Hence, they can be used for FPGA implemen-
tations as well as standard cell ASIC implementations. Tiri
et al. developed SABL [5], which is a custom logic style,
and WDDL [15], which is a logic style consisting of stan-
dard cells. In the remainder of this section both SABL and
WDDL will be discussed, because they represent the state-
of-the-art in logic styles.
2.3.1 Sense-Amplifier Based Logic (SABL)
To make the power consumption of a gate independent of
the input values, SABL achieves the following goals: the
output switching is independent of the input values and the
total load capacitance always sums up to a constant value.
The first goal is achieved by using differential and dy-
namic logic. Differential logic makes sure that a 1-0 input
transition causes the same output transitions as a 0-1 input
transition, but it does not hide the difference between a tran-
sition (1-0 or 0-1) and no transition. This problem is solved
by making the logic dynamic, i.e. precharging the output
in the first half of every clock cycle and evaluating the cor-
rect output value in the second half. In this way, there is a
switching event in every clock cycle.
The second goal is achieved by designing a secure cell
library in which the load capacitance of a gate is equal
for all input values. This library consists of an inverter, a
NAND-gate, an XOR-gate and a flip-flop, which should be
enough to implement all cryptographic algorithms. To guar-
antee that the pull-down networks are balanced and com-
pletely discharged, design rules for the pull-down network
are given in [16].
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Figure 3. SABL AND gate with Z = A ·B.
2.3.2 Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL)
The main drawback of the SABL approach is that it is
only suitable for custom ASIC implementations. WDDL
achieves the same goals as SABL by using cells from an
existing standard cell library. However, to reduce the load
on the precharge control signal, WDDL uses a precharge
“wave”, i.e. the precharge signal ripples through the com-
binatorial logic. In Figure 4 a cascaded WDDL AND gate
and flip-flop are shown. TheWDDL gate requires the inputs
to be precharged before they are sent to the complementary
gates. A precharge circuit after the registers makes sure the
next gates receive correct inputs.
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Figure 4. Cascaded WDDL AND gate and flip-flop.
2.4 Electromagnetic radiation attacks
A third side-channel is the electromagnetic radiation
[4, 9]. An ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA) attack can
be done by using the same methods as for power attacks.
Therefore, the terms Simple EMA (SEMA) and Differential
EMA (DEMA) are commonly used. However, EMA attacks
can extract much more information than power attacks. The
reason is that the latter measure the complete power con-
sumption, while EMA attacks can zoom in on smaller parts
of the circuit.
3 Fault attacks
The second kind of implementation attacks are fault at-
tacks. They are based on hardware faults, which are usually
caused by some unexpected condition or defect. However,
they can also be applied deliberately by the use of fault in-
sertion techniques. The damage they can cause was first
elaborated by Boneh et al. [3]. Their target application was
RSA with CRT. Biham and Shamir introduced differential
fault attacks (DFAs) on the DES algorithm [2] and they
showed that DFAs are applicable to any secret key cryp-
tosystem. In the research community two types of investi-
gations are being performed. The first type is investigating
the actual ways to induce faults in a cryptosystem i.e. it
deals with so-called physical security and the other one is
examining vulnerabilities in cryptographic algorithms with
the assumption that some faulty computation happened. In
this paper we consider only the former one.
Usual sources of faults are glitches (voltage, clock, tem-
perature, radiations i.e. “microwave attacks”) or beams (UV
light, X-rays, laser, camera flash, etc.). They can be semi-
invasive or invasive. For the former type of fault insertions
the best results were achieved by depackaging the chip (as
for invasive attacks), but the passivation layer of the chip
i.e. the shield covering the chip remains intact. More pre-
cisely, unlike invasive attacks they do not require electrical
contact to the metal surface. As an example of a cheap semi-
invasive attack optical fault induction attacks were intro-
duced by Skorobogatov and Anderson [14]. They showed
that it is possible to change the state of any individual bit in a
microcontroller by using a camera flash and a laser pointer.
Their target was an SRAM cell but this type of attacks is ap-
plicable to any other kind of memory as well. Another type
of semi-invasive attacks are done by electromagnetic induc-
tion i.e. eddy currents [10]. The follow-up work of Samyde
et al. [11] summarizes all kinds of possibilities to read secret
data from memories. They compare the effects caused by
optical induction on one side and eddy currents on the other
side. The conclusion was that for the latter resolution is not
so precise as for optical fault attacks. Skorobogatov and
Anderson suggested to use self-timed dual-rail logic as a
countermeasure. The idea behind this approach is not just to
have a logical 0 or 1 encoded as HL and LH (or vice versa),
but also to prohibit the HH state. Namely, this combination
signals an alarm, which will typically reset the processor.
This property is also present in WDDL logic (Sect. 2.3.2).
If the circuit is read before the output is ready, the outputs Z
and Z of Figure 4, will not yet be differential. As WDDL is
glitch-free, only one transition can occur during evaluation
from the precharge state to a differential state (01 or 10).
Considering glitches-based attacks, the first practical re-
sult was given by Aumu¨ller et al. in [1]. They introduced
a spike, i.e. a certain deviation from a standard interval for
a smart card parameter e.g. the supply voltage. They per-
formed two attacks on a smart card with an RSA coproces-
sor and proved that these type of attacks are feasible even if
some countermeasure [13] is deployed.
Most of the techniques for fault insertion target the se-
cret data that are manipulated during the execution of a
cryptographic algorithm, but some are directed on faults on
memories. An overview paper dealing with several ideas
about these issues for memories and their secure use is the
work of Neve et al. [8]. The authors also mention a number
of countermeasures to prevent those threats, such as: dual
rail precharged logic, sensors, etc. Sensors are supposed to
monitor sudden changes in temperature, voltage or similar
and act accordingly. By their function they can be active or
passive.
All attacks mentioned above are considered to be semi-
invasive. Invasive fault induction includes probing the cir-
cuit with active or energy probes [17]. Other options men-
tioned are electron or ion beams.
As for countermeasures, [11] mentions the importance of
hardware countermeasures and lists the necessary require-
ments for the protection of modern smart cards. Means to
achieve minimal physical security include: implementing
the CPU using random place-and-route to avoid the visibil-
ity of the registers, memory encryption, use of self-timed
logic with built-in alarm propagation and alarm sensors for
temperature, X-rays, etc. It is up to the manufacturers to
investigate the risks and decide about the best combination
of countermeasures.
4 Conclusions
This contribution gives an overview of the state-of-the
art in side-channel and fault attacks. Implementing cryp-
tographic circuits is always a trade-off between security
and performance. This work focuses on the most efficient,
but also the most costly type of countermeasures, namely
countermeasures at the circuit level. However, for security-
crucial applications these kind of countermeasures might be
unavoidable.
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